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In this paper, we develop a microsimulation to assess the
distributional consequences of the existing system of taxes and
transfers and to compare those consequences with the impacts of
several alternative credit income-tax systems for the 1970 popula-
tion and income distributions. Then we use this microsimulation
to explore the properties of proportional tax schedules combined
with lump-sum credits as a simple form of redistribution that can
be used as a reference standard against which other redistributive
mechanisms can be assessed.
Our analysis begins with a concept we call "primary" income,
which is the money incbme accruing to families and individuals
from their current productive activities and other private trans-
actions. Tax and transfer systems modify this primary income to
produce what we call "final" income, which measures the claims
of individuals and families on resources. Our analysis examines a
variety of final income distributions. Any tax and transfer system
redistributes some of the gross revenue it raises, using the rest (the
net revenue) to finance the direct expenditure programs of the
publicsector(defense, education, highways, and soon) in
combination with other public revenue sources. The alternative
systems we specify can be considered comparable to the status
quo in the sense that we require them to raise the same net
revenue as the current system. Within this constraint, we make
drastic alterations in the present system by imagining that almost
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all the current programs—Social Security taxes and benefits, public
assistance, federal individual income tax, state and local income,
sales, and property taxes—are replaced simultaneously by one
simplified credit income tax operating on a comprehensive tax
base.'In doingthis, we give no recognition to political or
administrative constraints that would make the realization of such
a scheme impossible or unwise. We also make no allowance for
possible changes in the distribution of primary income due to the
level or nature of redistributive activities, although the greater the
deviations from the current system, the more likely such changes
would be.
Before we proceed with our analysis we would like to consider
briefly the "cost" of redistribution—a concept given prominence
by discussions of the welfare reform plans introduced during
President Nixon's first term. There is no concept of cost obviously
appropriate for application to income redistribution questions. If
we had a social-welfare function in which we and you really
believed, we could simply maximize it with respect to the income
distribution and would not need a notion of cost. This question is
considered further below. Since we do not have such a function,
concepts of cost must be considered. At one extreme, there is a
strong a priori basis for expecting total output to be sensitive to
the level and type of redistribution; the change in total output is
one concept of cost that appeals to an economist. For non-
marginal changes, however, the measurement of real output
changes is difficult. Labor-supply elasticities of various kinds are
required, and lack of firm estimates of such magnitudes has
motivated negative-income-tax experiments in New Jersey and
elsewhere. At the other extreme, the cost might be reckoned as
simply the total dollar amount the Treasury would be obliged to
write checks for in a given year. This "Treasury-.throughput"
measure of cost has some appeal because of its concreteness and
itsbearing on the extent of redistribution, butithas the
disadvantage of making a program paying out gross benefits that
are then partially taxed away appear spuriously costly relative to
one which pays only net benefits and collects only net taxes. It is,
thus, of little interest or relevance except as it bears upon the cost
of administration, i.e., how many bureaucrats, clerks, machines,
1Wehave left in place some public transfer programs which are not
redistributive in nature but have made the receipts taxable.Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans77
lawyers, and accountants would be engaged in the mechanics—
paper work and legal work—connected with the system. This
notion of administrative costs, though not the subject of this
paper, is certainly legitimate and the amount involved may be
significant.
Insofar as the administrative and output costs are ignored, a
zero sum redistribution, by definition, gives to one group the same
number of dollars thatit takes from another. The group of
households as a whole has the same amount as before to spend on
shoes, and ships, and sealing wax. An individual taxpayer, of
course, has a great deal of interest in how much redistribution is
going to cost him; this depends on his particular circumstances and
may be a negative amount. It is possible to make some sense out
.of the cost question if one defines a specific group of families, e.g.,
those with red hair or, more relevantly, those with high incomes,
and then asks how a specified change in redistribution policy
affects their net tax bill.
The question of how much a particular redistribution costs,
then, can only be answered either (1) by discussing the imponder-
ables involved in foregone output or changed administrative costs;
or (2) by asking for clarification as to whose cost you are
interested in, a rich man's or a poor man's. We take a rather
different approach to the issue of producing one statistic that
defines a group of tax-and-transfer schemes with comparable
impact on the income distribution for the entire population.
Rather than calculating either of these notions of cost, we
compare redistributions on the basis of the fraction of personal
income explicitly intended for redistribution, i.e., distributed on a
basis without regard to income. This share of income may be
distributed, as in a credit income tax,2 on a per capita basis; or
according to schedules based on personal and family demographic
characteristics. The balance of individual or family income, of
course, is either extracted as net revenue for public uses or left in
the hands of the people who receivedit under the primary
distribution. Under certain administrative arrangements, this figure
could be the same as the Treasury-throughput concept mentioned
above.
2Thecredit income tax was proposed by Earl Roiph, "The Case for a
Negative Income Tax Device"[15].See also James Tobin, "Raising the
Incomes of the Poor" [181.78Harold W. Watts and Jon K. Peck
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The underlying theme of this paper is the need for better
understanding and wider discussion of distributional issues and
policies. For this, a better framework of analysis and more explicit
standards of comparison than those presently in use would be
valuable. While we are convinced that such a framework, or
standard, necessarily involves normative judgments, we do not
believe that broad concurrence in a minimal set of judgments is
impossible. We have, therefore, utilized a redistributional device
which, in our view, falls within many people's definition of
fairness—a simple credit income tax, consisting of a lump-sum
grant and a tax schedule linear in income—as a standard form of
taxation against which actual systems of taxes and transfers or
specific variations can be compared.
The first part of the mechanism is a flat-rate proportional tax.
This has a superficial evenhandedness, since it is neither progres-
sive nor regressive and can be derived from the application of the
principle of equal sacrifice applied to a utility function that is
proportional to the logarithm of income: the Bernouilli assump-
tion aboututility.Although there seems to exist a general
acceptance of the idea of progressive taxation, we have chosen the
proportional rule as a minimum standard of fairness in the belief
thatvirtually no one would seriously press the merits of a
less-than-proportional (regressive) formula. However, we have not
considered here the question of what kinds of income should be
included in the tax base. The other part of the mechanism is the
credits, and here again we have aimed at a principle of equal
treatment in absolute terms of all persons or equivalent families,
regardless of their level of income. This principle provides, at least,
a starting point which may be useful in evaluating alternative
plans, even though the definition of an equivalent family is not
self-evident. (Note that the redistribution issue is here separated
into a debate about principles of taxation and a debate about the
actual amount of redistribution which should be effected under
suchprinciples.3) The resultingtax and transfer systemis
extremely easy to work with and easy to describe both for
analysts and taxpayers. In addition, several authors have recently
suggested that linear or nearly linear tax structures may have
important optimality properties over a range of assumptions.4
See Rawls [141 and Lerner [61.
See Mirrlees [71 and Sheshinski [161.Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans79
Nevertheless, this linear tax scheme is capable of substantial
amounts of redistribution and with a 100 percent tax is capable of
achieving whatever notion of equality is built into the credit plan.
Average net taxes can be quite progressive, varying from negative
values toward an asymptotic rate equal to the marginal or gross
tax rate.
Withall these considerations in mind, itis proposed that
a linear credit tax using poverty-standard credits be adopted as a
"canonical" form of redistribution against which alternatives may
be compared. It embodies a simple and easily grasped notion of
equity, which need not be regarded as final or optimal or even
popular; it is, however, a convenient standard that enables us to
focus attention more precisely on the case for and against specific
departures from it.
An alternative to comparing redistributions on the basis of the
fraction of total income given out via the credit is to measure the
total change in an income distribution induced by a redistribution
plan with a net revenue of zero as
c=i
where is the income of the ith unit before taxes and transfers,
and YA, is its income afterward. The sum is taken over all units in
the population. C does not measure a total cost, but it does reflect
the magnitude of the overall redistribution. For a linear tax
system, this statistic is directly related to the fraction of the
before-tax personal income which is redistributed independently
of income. To see this, suppose that the tax system has a constant
marginal tax rate, t (applied only to positive, incomes), and a
constant lump-sum grant, a. Then for YA nonnegative:
YAI(l—t)YBi+a
and
Since the total net taxis zero,t = where the
lEp
population is of size N, and p is the set of indexes of theunits80Harold W. WattsandJon K. Peck




Since the term in brackets is constant by assumption, C is directly
proportional to lal for any given population. If we had defined C
in terms of squared changes instead of their absolute values, C
would be proportional to a2. When the demogrant5 differs for
different population units, hOwever, C and the sum of the grants
are not uniquely related to each other. (Constraining two different
demogrant systems to have the same value of C as well as to yield
zero net revenue is, unfortunately, too expensive a computational
task for us.)
The choice of a scale on which to base the credits is crucial. A
simple and appealing possibility is to allocate equal credits to all
persons. This would be a more satisfactory choice if it were
possible to deal realistically with individual lifetime incomes either
for statistical analysis or for actual tax administration. In fact, we
must deal with income over shorter periods, usually one year, and
recognize that the family or household is the smallest unit to
which many kinds of income can be allocated. Since families are
very diversely constituted, some means to standardize them must
be found. Although they have many drawbacks, the poverty
thresholds for various sizes and kinds of families represent the
most widely used and recognized scale of equivalence. We shall
therefore use this scale to normalize family incomes; that is, we
shall use the ratio of income to the .poverty threshold6 appropriate
for each family, termed the welfareratio,as the basis for
comparingfamilies'needs. This normalizationisparticularly
questionable for high-income families, but in those calculations
which assume diminishing marginal utility, inaccuracies in the
normalization become less important as income rises. Tax credits
The term demogrant is used here as synonymous with the credit part of
a credit income tax. It emphasizes the property that the credits are lump-sum
amounts which may be related to demographic and family characteristics but
not to income or wealth status.
6For a definition and explanation of the current poverty ("low income")
thresholds, see Characteristics of the Low Income Population 1970 [411.Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans81
in the standard redistribution are allocated in proportion to these
thresholds.
In summary then, we are concerned with the variety of
redistributions that are, by assumption, "costless." No allowance
is made for output or administrative costs. The question is, simply,
who recieves what proportion of a fixed total of final income. We
will consider specific population groups, defined both in terms of
their demographic characteristics and in terms of their income
status. We evaluate the cost to such groups, or the benefits,
relative either to the status quo or relative to a zero-redistribution
norm. For readers with highly developed a priori notions about an
equitable income distribution, the relatively raw and disaggregated
distributions of final income for various groups will be the most
interesting results. We have attempted, however, to supply several
alternative redistributions. For this, we have adopted a group of
primitive utility-based inequality measures that can be readily
evaluated. These will be shown both in fully aggregated form and
with breakdowns which show the impact on various demographic
groups and on the poor and nonpoor subpopulations.
First of all,as mentioned before, we use a family income
welfare-ratio measure to normalize different family compositions.
In the utility analysis, we assume that this ratio is the argument of
eachperson'sutilityfunction.Utilitycan then be suitably
aggregated for each family and for groups of families.7 The class
of utility functions and inequality measures we consider, which
has been suggested by Atkinson [11, includes a wide range of
assumptions about the rate of decline of marginal utility with
increases in the welfare index. This class of functions includes as
special cases a linear utility function (with constant marginal
utility) and a logarithmic function, where marginal utility declines
in proportion to the inverse of the welfare index. It also includes
measures with more rapidly falling marginal utility, two of which
we have used.
Let us now turn to further discussion of the tax base we are
using. We refer to this as primary income. In so doing, we are
trying to use a term which does not connote close conformity
with any of the commonly used income concepts and to signal the
possibility that some of our approximations may be inaccurate.
In order to deal with negative and zero incomes we do not allow the
argument of the utility function to fall below 0.1.82Harold W. Watts and Jon K. Peck
We are aiming at a concept which measures the flow of income to
families and individuals prior to any tampering by the public
sector. We cannot, however, undo all the real allocational and
distributional consequences of public sector activities, as this
would require an elaborate general equilibrium analysis.
For thepresentcalculations, we haveused the Current
Population Survey (CPS) money income concept as adjusted in the
MERGE File to conform to aggregate control totals, minus public
transfers from Social Security, public assistance, unemployment
insurancebenefits,workmen'scompensation,andincome-
conditioned veterans' benefits. To this, we have added realized
capital gains. This income concept totals $679 billion for the
simulated 1970 population in the MERGE File, which is nearly
$125billionless than total personal income in the national
accounts for 1970, both because of the transfer payments that
have been deducted and because of various imputations in the
national accounts that are not fri the MERGE File. We have,
however, in our calculations retained those public transfers with
the exception of Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) thatare not primarily designed to affect the size
distribution of income.
The basic strategy is first to calculate a "final" income based on
the status quo of taxes and transfers as they existed in 1970, and
then to compare the redistribution effected by those policies with
a group of alternative redistributions produced by simple credit-
income-tax formulas, which differ from each other in the formula
for the credit and in the amount of income redistributed. An
attempt has been made to be quite inclusive as regards taxes at all
levels. A disproportionate interest is always taken in the federal
individual income tax, because it is the largest single tax program
affecting households directly and because it is a universal program
subject to debate and change at the federal policy level; but other
taxes, in the aggregate, constitute a similar proportion of the
difference between primary and final income and need to be
accounted for in any comprehensive assessment of overall redis-
tribution. Hence, from primary income we have subtracted federal
individualincome taxes,employeecontributionsforSocial
Security, property taxes, state individual income taxes, and sales
taxes.8Finally, the transfers that were subtracted from CPS
For the assumption made about the incidence of the property tax, see
the appendix.Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans83
income are added back in. We take no account of the federal
corporate income tax in this analysis. Thus we must interpret our
status quo final income as the total money receipts—after taxes
and transfers—available for spending on goods and services, with
prices adjusted for both the elimination of sales taxes and the
payment of housing expenses other than the property tax.9
This final income must be clearly distinguished from the usual
concept of disposable income, which only deducts income and
payroll taxes but includes such items as imputed rental income of
households; hence, disposable income is the amount available for
expenditure on goods and services as actually priced. The rationale
for using final instead of disposable income is that states regard
property and sales taxes as substitutes for income taxes. So
calculated, status quo final income totals $566 billion, which is
$ 113 billion, or 16.6 percent, less than the $679 billion of primary
income reckoned for 1970. In other words, the net aggregate
effects of current tax and transfer policies—federal, state, and local
—are to redistribute income in ways to be discussed below and
to extract $113 billion of purchasing power for financing various
direct-expenditure programs. Some of these programs, of course,
are deliberately redistributive, such as food stamps and housing
subsidies.Others, such aseducation, highways, and national
defense, are not, although they have some redistributive effects.
However, these are not the subject of our inquiry.
In gross tenns, the existing taxes we take account of actually
collect $54 billion more than the $113 billion described above,
but thosedollars are returned to the purchasing power of
households in the form of transfers. The simplified credit-tax
schemes that we introduce for comparison are treated as complete
replacements for this entire tax and transfer system. They have all
•been calibrated to yield the same $113 billion of net revenue—or
(equivalently) to reduce primary income down to the final income
of $566 billion—as do the status quo policies. In gross terms, the
tax is a simple proportional one applied to primary income as the
base. If one were concerned only to raise the required net revenue,
leaving the primary relative distribution unaltered—which is a
hypothetical policy of zero redistribution—a tax of 16.6 percent
on primary income would be sufficient. We vary the level of
redistribution from this point by increasing the fraction of
In the alternative redistributions, this results in some overstatement of
the final income for owners of rental property who report such income on
the 1040 federal form and equivalent understatement for renters.84Harold W. Watts and Jon K. Peck
the gross tax by a given proportion—say, 10 percent—and then
distributing the resulting added gross revenue—$68 billion in this
case—as refundable tax credits, on a basis which is not a function
of income.
In addition to varying the level of redistribution,i.e., the
fraction of primary income which is distributed as tax credits, we
examine six different credit structures. The plans investigated are
summarized in Table 1. The first structure is for tax credits that
are proportional to family poverty thresholds. It is assumed that
relative "needs" are measured .by these thresholds, and that it is,
therefore, reasonable to allocate credits against gross taxes in
proportion to the needs or responsibilities of the family. This is
consistent with the choice of poverty thresholds for normalizing
family incomes.
The poverty threshold structure of credits is used with four
different levels of redistribution, viz., 10 percent, 20 percent, 30
percent, and 50 percent. As explained above, these imply gross
proportional taxes ranging from 26.6 percent to 66.6 percent of
primary income. This covers a range from relatively weak to quite
drastic redistribution. At one end,1 2 percent of final income
reflects the uniform distribution of credits and 88 percent reflects
the initial distribution of primary income. At the other end, only
40 percent of final income reflects the initial income distribution.
The table indicates the fraction of the poverty standard that the
four levels of distribution afford. Also indicated are the dollar
amounts due the prototypical urban male-headed family of four.
The five other structures used are replicated for only two levels
of redistribution: 10 percent and 30 percent. The first of these is a
simple per capita demogrant with credits of $341 at the 10
percent level, and $1 ,022 at the 30 percent level, allocated to each
person in a family. Next is a per adult allowance which pays $520
or $1,559 at the two redistribution levels to each person over 18.
A simple child allowance was considered as a contrast but was
rejected because the adverse effect on aged persons, who are left
without Social Security, makes the case uninteresting. Instead we
have explored a pair of hybrid plans: At the 10 percent level, the
same Social Security benefits as the status quo are paid, and the
remainder of the $68 billion is allocated as tax credits equally
amongallpersons under18.At the 30 percent level of
redistribution, Social Security benefits are doubled and again the
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results in child allowances of approximately $500 and $2,000
respectively. The last two plans employ credits that are graduated
according to age. In the first.instance (age scale 1), the population
is divided into aged, (65andover), other adults (18 to 64), and
children (17 and under), and these three groups get credits with
relative values 3:2:1. In the. second instance (age scale 2), four
groups are distinguished, including two categories of children:
aged 10 to 17and 0 to 9. The younger children. receive only half
as much as the older ones. The combination of the six alternative
structureswiththeredistributionlevelvariations resultsin
fourteen tax systems. These variations were chosen to show how
the actual distributions of income for the United States.would be
altered by.differentlevels or degrees of redistributional activity,
and to explore the consequences of alternative structures for the
tax credits.
THE EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE
REDISTRIBUTIONS ON INCOME SHARES
As mentionedearlier, we have adopted a"welfare-ratio"
normalization of income, and hence we do not display the
traditionaldistribution by dollar-income brackets. While this
normalization is useful in securing comparability among families
of different size, it does not render fully comparable categories of
families which are treated as distinct in our existing tax and
transfer system. Indeed, there are important differences with
regard to the equity of income shares among these categories.
We distinguish, instead, six mutually exclusive and exhaustive
groups. Individuals 65 and over form one group, and families
headed by an aged person .formthe second. These two groups
together contain nearly 92 percent of all aged persons and
relatively few persons under 65. The remaining, groups are all
headed by nonaged persons. Individuals form the third group,
families with female heads form the fourth, and the last two
groups are small to moderate-sized male-headed families (2 to 5
persons)'° and large male-headed families (6' or more). Within
these groups, the welfare ratio is more reliable as an indicator of
economic or income status. We have chosen these groupings for
0Thisis the modal family: more than. 55 percent of all persons live in
such families.Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans87
severalreasons.The aged andfemale-headed categoriesare
presently recognized as having a differential basis for income
support. Individuals of all ages are difficult to compare with
families in terms of income needs. Finally, large families are often
overlooked in our tendency to focus on the four-person archetype.
Section B of Table 2 displays the distribution of total need, as
measured by the poverty thresholds, and the distribution of
persons in total and by age status across the six groups listed
above. Section A of 'the same table shows how income is
distributed among these groups—both primary income and the
fifteen versions of final income. It should be noted here that the
status quo redistributed a substantial amount of income to the
aged and female-headed categories, most of which is offset by
reductionsinthesharesgoingto nonaged individuals •and
male-headed families of small to moderate size. By contrast, the
poverty-standard redistribution adds to the shares of all groups
except the modal group, which is the only one that now gets a
larger share of primary income than its share'of (poverty-standard)
need. With a poverty-standard credit structure, less is provided to
the aged and female-headed units than the status quo up 'to a level
of 30 percent redistribution. None of the structures at the 10
percent level does as well by these categories as does the status
quo. They all, however, allocate more to the large families and
nonaged individuals. Not surprisingly, the Social-Security-plus-
planconforms mostcloselytothe current
outcome; it differs mainly in giving more to large male-headed
families than is currently case. Clearly the poverty standard
and the age-scaled credits are similar in their impact, and both
yield less redistribution from individuals or small families to large
families than does a flat per capita credit.
However, we are most directly interested in income redistribu-
tion among welfare strata. Table 3 contains the basic outcome in
terms of primary- a.nd final-income shares. The first three columns
•indicate how income is distributed among. the lowest 20 percent of
the population of persons ranked by the welfare ratio of primary
income. This group .is approximately equivalent to the poor. The
next stratum contain 50 percent of the 'population and ranges
from the near-poor at 110 percent of the poverty level up to the
moderately comfortable375 percent of poverty. The third
group, the top 30 percent,is all above 375 percent of poverty level

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans91
the fourth column, the top 5 percent is shown separately—the
lowest income in this group is 8.3 times the pOverty level before
tax andtransfers.The last four columns show several subgroups of
these strata—the aged, female-headed families, and male-headed
families.
Itis important to notice that the status quo redistributes a
substantial amount toward the lowest 20 percent of the income
distribution. Their share increases from 2.8 percent of primary
income to nearly 7.0 percent of final income. This is nearly as
much as the 7.2percentachieved by the poverty-standard credit
tax at a 20 percent redistribution level. However, the middle 50
percent, in contrast, receive only 35 percent under the current tax
system, as compared with the nearly 38 percent they would get
under that same 20 percent linear tax scheme. The extra 3 percent
is retained by the highest 30 percent with the top 5 percent
getting one-third of the extra. Moreover, as the level of redis-
tribution is increased, the share going to the middle 50 percent
continues toincrease.Indeed, looking further down to the
different tax-credit structures, there is no structure at the 10
percent level which is not noticeably more generous to the middle
50 percent than is our present policy. At given redistribution
levels, the Social-Security-plus-child-allowance plans provide the
largest gains to the poor, but even here there is no tendency for
the extra gains to be at the expense of the middle majority.
If one compares the treatment of aged and female-headed
families, it is clear that the poverty-standard law at the 30 percent
redistribution rate is most comparable with the status quo. But
that law would. increase the share going to poor male-headed
families from 2 percent to 3.5 percent and raise the transfer going
to male-headed families in the middle 50 percent from 26.7
percent to 30.9 percent. This phenomenon is the result of current
neglect of the working poor, as well as some squeezing of the lower
middle class wage-earning group. The top 30 percent now receive
nearly 7 percent more of total final income than they would under
this"fair"redistribution. Clearly,the United States already
engages in substantial redistribution; and for the groups that are
"poorest," the amount is equivalent to a level of nearly 30 percent
on a poverty-standard credit tax. However, it is also clear that the
male-headedfamilies of modest means have not been given
comparable treatment, and that it would not be necessary to
penalize the families near the median welfare-ratio level in order to92Harold W. Watts and Jon K. Peck
be more generous—and more uniformly so—to the poor and the
near-poor.
Table 4 shows how the distribution of persons by welfare ratio
isaltered by redistribution. The current policies reduce the
fractions below the poverty level and the fraction more than four
times aboveThe effect of high redistribution levelsis to
concentrate more and more persons in the 2 to 4 range of the
welfareratio, which includes the mean (2.7). The strongly
redistributive poverty-standard law at the 50 percent redistribu-
tion rate completely eliminates poverty; it also decimates the
stratum above eight times the poverty level and concentrates 70
percent of the population in the 2 to 4 range, which now contains
only 35 percent. The Social-Security-plus-child-allowance plans are





Status quo 15.5 31.1 35.3 15.32.8
Poverty standard ioa17.1 28.637.0 14.82.5
11.531.042.1 13.71.7
5.033.548.5 11.8
soa 0.022.4 70.5 6.60.5
Per capita wa16.3 28.537.8 14.92.5
Per adult ioa17.8 28.436.3 14.92.6
Social Security +child
allowance 10a14.031.238.0 14.52.3
Age scale 1 ioa16.829.036.8 14.92.5
Age scale 2 ba17.028.9 36.7 14.82.6
Per capita 5.728.052.8 12.3 1.2
Per adult 7.833.344.4 13.1
Social Security +
child allowance 5.4 24.1 57.6 11.8 1.1
Age scale 1 5.032.948.6 12.2 1.3
Age scale 2 5.433.946.9 12.5 1.3
a Redistribution rate. This rate is measured as the percentage of pretax or
primary income devoted to redistribution.Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans93
seen here to be the most effective in reducing dispersion
given level of redistribution.
at any
Figure 1 shows how the distribution of persons as ranked by
welfare ratios is altered by redistribution.The cumulativedis-
tribution is plotted on log-probability scales (a log-normal distribu-
tion would provide a straightline). Itis evident here that the
status quo system reduces dispersion and poverty; it is also clear
that the higher levels of redistribution,30 percent to50 percent,
produce a noticeable amount of added equalization.
Welfare ratio (log scale)
FIGURE 1: Cumulative Distributions of Persons by Welfare Ratio of Family
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Figures.2 through 6 display the Lorenz curves for the status quo
and various alternative redistributions. Once again we see that
current policies do tend to equalize the distribution, and that the
alternatives that we have worked with cover a broad range of shift
• in the curves. It should be repeated here, however, that we have
not allowed for any labor-force response by the economy to the
• taxand transfer system.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF SUMMARY
MEASURES OFTHE WELFARE DISTRIBUTION
While it is useful, and for many purposes adequate, to observe














Percentage of poverty level (population for primary curve)
FIGURE2: .LorenzCurves for Primary Income; Status Quo, and Poverty
Scale Redistribution at 10 PercentPercentQgeof final income'
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0
FIGURE 3:Lorenz CurvesforStatus Quo and Alternative
90100
Levels of
Redistribution Using Poverty Standard Credits
strata, it is also of interest to evaluate more summary descriptions
which attempt to. condense the plethora of numbers into a few,
more comprehensible indicators. As we view this problem, itis.
again one of embodying some standard of "fairness" in a formula
that enables us to rank and compare final distributions.
The problem of what summary statistics to use in describing an
income distribution and what measures of inequality
priate is an ancient
are appro-
one. The most commonly, used measures are
the mean or median income and the Gini coefficient: However, as
has been observed, most recently by Atkinson [1] and earlier by
Dalton [5], we should be concerned with some notion of social
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FIGURE 4:Lorenz Curves for Alternative Tax CreditStructures Using 30
Percent Redistribution
related tosome social welfare measures. Whatfollows includes a
summary of Atkinson's solution to this problem.
Our goal is to rank the alternative income distributions by social
welfare. For this purpose, we use a simple social welfare function,
W, described below. Many factors which affect
not taken into account in the formulation we use. Our W might,
perhaps, be called a partial social-welfarefunction to emphasize
that other factors are also important. However, we only use W to
compare alternative income distributions under ceteris paribus
assumptions. It could still be argued that the assumptions about
utility and W lead to the omission of important factors which are
0 10 203040 50607080
social welfareare40
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FIGURES:LorenzCurvesforStatusQuo andSocial-Security-Plus-
Child-Allowance Plan
not constant as the distribution changes,but we do not pursue
more complex formulations. Assume that there exists a social
welfare function,W, which is symmetric and additively separable,
W=> U(w1)f(w1),
where U is the individual
identical
utility function which is assumed to be
for all persons and f is the probability function for the
(finite) population. Assume further that the individual
function,
utility
U, is increasing and concave. Under these assumptions
two distributions, with the same mean, can be ranked
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FIGURE 6:Lorenz Curves for Age-Related Plans
without further assumptions about utility functions if, and only if,
the two Lorenz curves do not cross. When the means differ, the
distribution with the higher meanwill be preferred if its Lorenz
curveiseverywhere abovetheLorenz curve of the other
distribution.'1
When thedistributions cannot be ranked without further
information on the utility function, we choosecertain particular
functionalformsfor U whichareunique up to a linear
''Our exercisemight be thought always to result in distributions whose
means are equal; however, since we have normalized income by the poverty
level, redistributions which preserve the aggregate incomes can change the
mean of the welfare ratios.
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transformation and have one argument—the family's welfare ratio.
Any choice of functions is necessarily subjective. Value judgments
must be made sometime, however, and our treatment has the
virtue of making these judgments explicit.
Once a utility function is chosen, a measure of inequality can be
constructed by analogy with the certainty-equivalent calculations
inrisktheory.'2 To do this, define the equally distributed-
equivalent level of normalized income, Wede, as the per capita
amount which would give the same total utility as the actual
distribution gives if each person received Wede. That is, U(wede) is
the expected value of the utility function over the distribution of
w. More formally,
U(Wede) =E f(w1).
Clearly, Wede depends on the particular utility function chosen.
Then the inequality measure defined is ju =1(wede/p), where p
is the mean of the distribution of w. The index I appears similar to
a Gini coefficient, because it lies in the interval [0, 11, with zero
corresponding to perfect equality, and one, maximum inequality;
but, as will be seen below, the index I will generally give a ranking
of distributions by inequality different from the Gini coefficient
ranking. Under our assumptions aboutU,social welfareis
maximized when all incomes are equal, but we would not assert
that complete equality is the ideal distribution. Our analysis is too
unrealistic to support such a conclusion, but Wede does suggest an
upper bound on the efficiency losses which could be suffered as a
consequence of redistribution without producing a decrease in
total social welfare.'3
What reasonable restrictions should be put on the class of
possible utility functions? One criterion, suggested by Atkinson
and adopted by us, is what he terms "constant relative inequality
aversion,"i.e.,if we transform a distribution by a change of
12 Wealso report Gini coefficients, but as Newbery [9] has shown, there
exists no additive utility function which ranks distributions in the same order
as the Gini coefficient.
'3Itis not obvious that the linear tax systems we investigate are inferior
to our current tax system in terms of allocative efficiency. Indeed, this is one
of the arguments usually cited in favor of a demogrant system.100Harold W. Watts and Jon K. Peck
location and scale, the inequality measure should not change. This,
plus concavity, requires that U(w) be of the form:
U(w) =
A+BlnwE1.
This is a one-parameter family indexed by e, since A and B are
arbitrary. When e is zero, marginal utility is constant; as e rises,
marginal utility falls more rapidly, dU/dw =




Thesemeasures are invariant under linear transformations.
We have performed our calculations for four different utility
functions corresponding to values forof 0 (linear),1(loga-
rithmic),1 .5(reciprocal square root), and 2 (reciprocal). Some
respondents report negative or zero income. Since we do not
believe that this really represents the claims of these units on
resources, we have arbitrarily chosen to calculate the welfare ratio
as either the reported ratio or .1, whichever is larger. That is, no
one is allowed to have a claim on resources of less than 10 percent
of his poverty level.'4
These are individual utility functions, but the argument of the
functions is the welfare ratio of the family. To find the utility for
a family, individualutilityismultiplied by familysize.In
summary, we (1) assume all persons' utility functions are identical;
(2) take some account of economies realized by families living
together through the normalization process; (3) assume that there
is no inequality within a family; and (4) assume that each family
member's utility counts equally in the total welfare of society.
14Theexact choice of a minimum wisnot crucial for the plans we
investigate, although a minimum of zero would give very different answers. In
the status quo income distribution, only about 1.5 percent of the population
report a welfare ratio of less than .1; and in the other distributions, the
percentage is also very small. In fact, many of these cases come from families
reporting a negative w,andtheir permanent income is likely to be much
larger than the reported amount.Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans101
InTable 5, we have assembled several averages and inequality
measures describing the variousfinaldistributions. The first
column contains the average individual welfare ratio, where the
individual ratio for a person is equal to the welfare ratio of his
family. The next three columns contain the "equally distributed-
equivalent" welfare ratios corresponding to e values of 1 .0,1 .5,
and 2.0, respectively. The first column is, of course,. Wede (0). It is
worth pointing out that these can be regarded as
(1) is simply the geometric mean of individual welfare ratios and
Wede(2)istheir harmonic mean, while Wede(1.5)is some
parametric hybrid average—and we can appeal to theorems about
the relative size of these means (applied to positive numbers) to
infer that the equivalent income will be smaller, the larger is e for
any given distribution. Alternatively, observe that Wede(e)falls as
rises, because the faster marginal utility falls, the greater is the
amount of income which can beredistributed away from
high-income families for any given utility loss.
Columns 5 through 7 contain the inequality index values for e =
1.0,1.5, and 2.0.is identically zero and is, therefore, not
shown. As explained above, these values indicate the fraction of
current (unequally distributed) income that would be required to
achieve the same total utility if distributed equally. Equivalently,
itplaces an upper bound on the income loss that could be
"afforded" by a redistribution without lowering average welfare.




Finally,the Gini coefficient is shown in the last column. In
comparing our estimates of the Gini coefficients with others in the
literature, it must be recalled that the population is measured in
units of need. The average utilities have not been shown, but they
can be derived by substituting the appropriate Wedeintothe
formula given above.
The means and inequality measures are shown for the overall
distribution, separately for the poor and nonpoor (w < 1, w1),
and for each of thesix subgroups of the population. The
inequality measures for such subgroups reflect only internal


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.110Harold K'. Watts and Jon K. Peck
Figure 7 shows how the overall inequality measures vary with
the level of redistribution, that is, the fraction of primary income
distributed in proportion to the poverty standard. We note that
the three utility-based measures show a curvilinear relation to the
level such that successive fractions of redistribution contribute less
to reduction of inequality. The Gini coefficient, on the other
hand, declines in a linear way. All these measures should converge
at zero when the level reaches 83.4 percent, since that fraction
plus the net revenue fraction of 16.6 percent exhaust primary
income.
The asterisks on the curves of Figure 7 indicate, the levels of
inequality that characterize the status quo distribution of final
income. Thus, our present policies correspond to a redistribution
level of approximately 10 to 12 percent.
Table 6 presents the rankings of the several tax-credit structures
according to the various inequality measures. The measures have
been normalized to make the current law equal 100 percent.
Separate rankings are provided for the 10 and 30 percent levels of
redistribution, and the inequality relative to the status quo of the
primary distribution is shown separately. As can be seen, the
choice of an inequality measure does affect the rankings, which
also change with the level of redistribution. The Social Security-
plus-child-allowance plan ranks first at the linear level and falls .to
last at the higher level of redistribution for 2.
The Gini coefficient, here, as in Figure 7, shows less sensitivity
and dispersion with respect to the variations introduced. For
example, the primary distribution is only 16 percent worse than
the status quo final distribution on the Gini scale, while it is 40 to
50 percent worse by the utility-based measures.
FINAL REMARKS
At the level of a basically arithmetic exercise to see what
happens when highly simplifiedcredit-tax redistributions are
applied to a relatively comprehensive pretransfer income base, the
work reported above requires no further interpretation, but there
are also more ambitious objectives lying behind the study. One is
to clarify the notion of cost and to supply a framework within
which more relevant equivalence classes of households could be
identified for comparative analysis. Toward this objective, a linear




FIGURE 7:Relation Between Inequality Measures and Levels of Redistribu-
tion for Poverty-Standard Credits
NOTE: The asterisk denotes level of status quo inequality.
Inequality
.8
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Comparison of Income Redistribution Plans113
been taken as a reference benchmark. The credit tax is required to
generate the same net revenue for nontransfer uses of the public
sector and to redistribute a variable fraction of primary income as
credits on a uniform basis. The fraction of income so redistributed
provides a convenient standardization for comparing alternative
creditstructures. Equivalence with nonlinear or other more
complex structures such as the status quo depends on specifying
additional criteria. For example, it was noted that in terms of the
various overall indicators of inequality, the status quo corresponds
to a credit tax at around 10 to 12 percent redistribution. In terms
of the impact on the poor, considered as a homogeneous group,
the current law does almost as well as a 20 percent redistribution.
Focusing on the aged and female heads, the status quo is more
nearly comparable to a 30 percent—say, 27 percent—level of
redistribution. By contrast, the allocation to poor male family
heads corresponds approximately to a 9 percent redistribution,
and the share for male heads in the middle 50 percent category
appears to be closer to a 4 to 5 percent redistribution.
Under the assumptions of this paper, the conclusion that
relative to the norm provided by the poverty credit tax, the
male-headed working poor and lower middle class have been
heavily overtaxed or undertransferred is unmistakable. Current
benefits are tilted strongly in the direction of the aged and the
female-headed; and while one can usually think of reasons why
these groups of the poor should be favored over others, itis
difficult to find adequate rationalizations for the disparities we
find, particularly in view of the large number of children to be
found in those male-headed poor and near-poor families. It is also
clear that a more active redistributive policy, by moving toward
the kind of equity embodied in the credit-tax formula, would not
work to the disadvantage of the large middle majority of taxpayers
as has often been assumed.
Under the 30 percent poverty-standard plan, the archetypical
small family with a male head would enjoy lower taxes up to an
income of $11,750; this accounts for 63 percent of such families.
Similarly, nearly 70 percent of the larger families with male heads
would benefit up to a pretax income of more than $15,500. As
indicated before, that plan would allocate more to each of the
categories of poor than does the status quo.
These results all assume a strictly proportional gross tax, but it
isclear that a more progressive structure for obtaining gross
revenue would be more advantageous to that broad middle group.114Harold LV. Watts and Jon K. Peck
We have found the framework of a standard reference point for
distributional analysis to be a useful one. In an area where value
judgments are necessarily the final determinants, there can be no
analytically definitive argument for the set we have chosen. The
use of some such standard is, however, illuminating; the most
useful form of criticism, in our view, should take the form of
specifying plausible alternatives. Our application of the inequality
measures proposed by Atkinson has confirmed their usefulness.
We find them more sensitive than the Gini coefficient, and they
have the added advantage of being logically related to a plausible
family of utility specifications.
Finally, we must say that our exploration into the arithmetic of
income distribution has produced a large volume of numbers; the
heavy burden of tables in this paper is only the tip of the iceberg.
A substantial amount of interpretation and assessment remains to
be done, but we hope that the findings presented here will move
the debate on issues of tax and welfare reform forward.
DATA APPENDIX
The data source for all calculations in this paper is the 1966
Brookings Institution Family MERGE File, adjusted to 1970
population and income levels.
The Brookings MERGE File
This file was created by Ben Okner under a grant from the
Office of Economic Opportunity from two sets of data, the 1967
Survey of Economic Opportunity and the 1966 Federal Individual
Income Tax File.It contains observations on a family basis,
combining survey information from the SEO with tax return data
from the Tax File. MERGE is in two sections: the first part, the
FAM subfile, contains the survey and tax return data for 26,192
Interview Units (families and single individuals) whose Current
Population Survey (CPS) income was less than $30,000 in 1966;
while the second part, the FAT subfile, has Internal Revenue
Service tax-return data only for 46,946 tax-return-filing units with
income of at least $30,000. The units in the FAT file represent
less than 2 percent of the total number of families, although they
represent a much larger percentage of total income; therefore, it is
adequate for our purposes to treat the units of the FAT file as if
they were Interview Units (IU) and to use estimates for theComparison of Income Redistribution Plans115
missingdemographic data we need. In particular, this requires us
to estimate the number of persons and children in the Interview
Units from the number of exemptions, and to assume that none of
these returns are filed by persons who are not the head or wife of
an IU. When secondary members of an IU file returns separately
from the head's return, their income is not included in the lU's
income total, but they are not likely to be counted as dependents.
We have used the FAM file plus a 20 percent subsample of the
FAT file in our calculations.
The details of the creation of the SEO, Tax, and MERGE files
are reported in Okner [10], [11], [121; SEO Codebook; and
Brookings Institution Computer Center [21. Only a few remarks
need to be made here. The MERGE File is intended to represent
the noninstitutional CPS population in calendar year 1966, but it
is far removed from the original tax and SEO data. Since the two
data sources used do not contain data on the same individuals, a
complex matching procedure was used by Okner and his associates
to associate one or more tax returns with each Interview Unit. The
resulting "sample" can be no better than this procedure. Some of
the difficulties with the matching procedure have been analyzed
by Sims [171, Budd [31, and Peck [13]. It is likely that some of
therelationships and distributionsin MERGE are distorted
measures of reality. We have tried to avoid relying on particularly
suspect joint distributions and, therefore, we do not report any
results on the impact of the various plans by race, for example.
In addition to the changes introduced by the merging process
itself, there are three other ways in which the data were modified:
(1) Extensive adjustments for nonreporting and underreporting
were made. These are discussed in the Okner papers cited above.
(2) Imputations were made for a number of items for which there
were no data in the file, particularly the amounts of property,
sales, and state and local income taxes paid by individuals, either
directly or indirectly via shifting to consumers or owners of
capital. (3) The 1966 MERGE File was projected forward to 1970,
using routines written at Brookings and control totals from the
1970 Census.
Imputations and Adjustments Made to the MERGE File
Three types of state and local taxes were imputed to all lUs in
the file, using routines devised by Okner. The taxes imputed were
property tax, state and local income taxes, and sales116Haroldh'. Watts and Jon K. Peck
The procedure used for estimating property taxes was as
follows. Property income was defined as the sum of interest
received, rental income, royalties, estate and gift income, divi-
dends, and 29 percent of income from farming and 14 percent of
income from nonfarm business (estimated returns on capital)
received by the IU. Negative amounts were not included. A tax
rate was applied to this total. The remainder of the direct tax was
found by taking percentages of the values of automobiles and
owner-occupiedhousing.Itwas assumed,inaddition, that
property taxes levied on the nonland assets of businesses and
farms are borne by consumers, and an adjustment was made based
on the unit's total consumption. Finally, renters were assumed to
bear all of the property tax on their housing, and this amount was
estimated from their monthly rent. The procedure for calculating
those taxes was modified for lUs who filed itemized tax returns in
such a way as to accept the taxes claimed as deductions as the
actual taxes paid (apart from the shifting estimates). It should be
emphasized that the total property tax figure estimated includes
both direct property taxes and indirect taxes assumed shifted to
renters and consumers.
The amount of state and local income taxes paid had to be
estimated for some lUs. If a tax return associated with an IU had
itemized deductions, the amount deducted for state and local
income taxes was accepted. Otherwise, the tax rate was estimated
from adjusted gross income (AGI) and family size and applied to a
"taxable income" defined as AGI minus exemptions of $1,000
each for the taxpayer and wife (if a joint return) and $500 for
each dependent. The estimated taxes were added for each tax
return in the IU to give the total state and local income tax. The
amount of sales tax paid was estimated as a percentage of total
consumption expeditures.
The last major adjustment to the data was to project the file
forward to 1970. This was done in two steps. First, the sample
weights associated with lUs were adjusted to bring the 1966
populationto1970 Census Bureau population figures. The
adjustment factor was afunction of four variables:(1) age
(seventeen classes), (2) race (white/nonwhite), (3) type of area
(urban, rural, nonfarm, farm), and the size of the family. Then,
the means of the distributions of the amounts of fifteen sources of
income and thirty-nine items in the tax returns were adjusted to
1970 levels. No attempt was made to take explicit account ofComparison of Income Redistribution Plans117
changes in benefit schedules for such items as Social Security
payments.
These procedures stop short of producing an estimate of the
total tax burden borne by a family. Specific taxes, such as a gaso-
line tax, and fees charged for government services, such as motor-
vehicle registration charges, are omitted. These taxes do not have
income redistribution as an objective and they are small compared
to the remainder of revenue collected under the present tax
system; therefore, it is acceptable to ignore them.
A much more important omission is the federal corporate
income tax. In a truly comprehensive assessment of the redistribu-
tive aspects of the taxation system, this tax would have to be
considered. In comparing our linear tax-demogrant systems with
the status quo, we have left the federal corporate tax unchanged
and have made no assessment of who pays it. The adoption of a
radicallydifferenttax system would surely affect corporate
financial behavior, but we ignore this as well as all other responses
of the economy.
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